What caused the crisis? What caused the crisis?
• The conventional wisdom is that the basic The conventional wisdom is that the basic cause of the current crisis was bad incentives in incentives in Co-movement between securitizations of AAArated tranches of subprime mortgages 9 rated tranches of subprime mortgages, commercial mortgages and firm CDSs increased
• The prices of AAA tranches of securitizations p went to levels that were very difficult to explain on the basis of fundamentals
• The April 2008 Bank of England Financial
Stability Report deduced that prices of these Stability Report deduced that prices of these securities at that time implied a 38% loss rateconsistent with a 76% default rate and an eventual 50% loss given default -that seemed much too high
• How can prices be so low if it is not fundamentals? fundamentals?
Alternative to the Bad Incentives View: Mispricing
• New information about subprime defaults led to a New information about subprime defaults led to a realization they were more risky than previously thought
• This led to sales of the AAA tranches as portfolios dj t d were readjusted
• The volume of sales overwhelmed the absorption The volume of sales overwhelmed the absorption capacity of the secondary markets for securitized assets and prices fell below fundamentals p 11
• Once the link between prices and fundamentals Once the link between prices and fundamentals for these products was broken it became risky to try to arbitrage
• These "limits to arbitrage" (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) pre ented prices ret rning to 1997) prevented prices returning to fundamentals
• It is like the dot.com bubble in that trying to arbitrage internet stocks led to bankruptcy
• The LTCM crisis arguably also exhibited mispricing
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Mispricing and the Paulson Plan Mispricing and the Paulson Plan
• The mispricing view of the crisis underlay The mispricing view of the crisis underlay the Treasury and Fed view that subprime mortgage assets could be bought at "holdmortgage assets could be bought at hold to-maturity" prices well above market prices and taxpayers could also make prices and taxpayers could also make money
• This was not well explained when the plan was presented to the public and Congress 13 was presented to the public and Congress • Banking regulation is different from other Banking regulation is different from other kinds of regulation in that there is no wide agreement on the market failures it is agreement on the market failures it is designed to correct
• It is backward looking in the sense that it t i l t t th was put in place to prevent the recurrence of past types of crises 15 How should banking regulation be designed?
• What are the benefits and costs of regulation? What are the benefits and costs of regulation?
• What exactly are the market failures?
• The Basel agreements illustrate the lack of a widely agreed theoretical framework 16 The market failures The market failures
The most important are:
The most important are: 
